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ENFORCING TRANSPORTATION CONTROL
PLANS: THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY VS. THE STATES
I. Introduction
In two recent actions, the Supreme Court has narrowed the con-
troversy that surrounded federal procedures for enforcing the Clean
Air Act.' Without discussing the statutory and constitutional issues
raised during years of litigation,3 the Court has removed a major
hurdle that faced the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
environmental groups seeking implementation of plans intended to
control and abate air pollution. Simultaneously, the broad author-
ity sought by the EPA and challenged by the states has been lim-
ited.
The Clean Air Act,' a long and complex statute, was enacted "to
protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air."5 It provides for
the establishment of national ambient' air quality standards7 and
the means for their attainment.' The Act sets out numerous meth-
ods to achieve the established standards. Notable among these are
1. EPA v. Brown, 97 S. Ct. 1635 (1977); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, sub. nom. Beame v. Friends of the Earth, 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 (1970) (hereinafter Act). See enforcement procedures in section 113
of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970).
3. See Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 832-42 (9th Cir. 1975). See also Friends of the Earth
v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 29-33, 36-39 (2d Cir. 1977).
4. The Act covers numerous topics and issues, including research, 42 U.S.C. § 1857b
(1970), establishment of standards, id. § 1857c-5 to c-7 and vehicle emissions, id. § 1857f-1
to f-12. This Comment will focus on the two sections concerning state implementation plans,
id. § 1857c-5, and federal enforcement procedures, id. § 1857c-8.
5. Id. § 1857(b)(1).
6. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 30 (2d Cir. 1977).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970). The Act provides that the ambient standards established
will apply nationally. However, a key element is that their attainment is essentially a local
matter. The Act, therefore, places responsibility on the states, Id. § 1857c-2(A). There is a
variation to the requirement that the states individually provide for attainment of the stan-
dards. That exception is that certain areas not entirely within, or larger than, a single state
may be designated an air quality control region. Id. § 1857c-2(b) (e.g., the designation of
the tri-state area surrounding New York City as the New Jersey-New York-Connecticut Inter-
state Air Quality Control Region. Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 499 F.2d 1118, 1120 n.1 (2d
Cir. 1974)).
8. See generally, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857b & 1857c, concerning research .and grant provisions
of the Act.
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reducing pollutants discharged from stationary sources, such as fac-
tories and refineries, and limiting the volume of pollution from mo-
bile sources, primarily motor vehicles, by raising automobile ex-
haust emission standards"0 and controlling the ordinary use of auto-
mobiles." To accomplish the latter goal, the Act required each state
to develop a transportation control plan (TCP). 2 A TCP may con-
tain various strategies, such as creating express bus lanes, establish-
ing bikeways, requiring the imposition of tolls on bridges, designed
to reduce the use of motor vehicles and the resulting pollution.
Pursuant to section 110 of the Act,'3 each state was to design a
plan and submit it to: the EPA, which could approve or request
revision of the plan." If a state failed to submit or revise a plan, the
EPA was authorized to promulgate a plan for it."5 If a state refused
to comply with a plan promulgated by the EPA, the Act granted the
Administrator of the EPA broad power to seek injunctive relief and
civil and criminal sanctions for noncompliance. 6
9. Id. § 1857c-6.
10. Id. § 1857f-1.
11. Id. § 1857c-5.
12. The statute refers to a state implementation plan (SIP). 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970).
Because that is a generic term used throughout the statute, most courts, when referring to
the plans discussed in this Note, use transportation control plan (TCP), a more descriptive
term. See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 38 (2d Cir. 1977); District of Columbia
v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir. 1975).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970).
14. Id. § 1857c-5(a)(1). This provision required the Administrator to approve any plan or
portion of a plan that met specified criteria. These criteria required that the plan had to have
certain components giving reasonable assurance that the standards would be met. Id. § 1857c-
5(a)(2)(A)-(H).
15. Id. § 1857c-5(c). The bases for the Administrator promulgating a plan are either
failure to act within the prescribed time, id. § 1857c-5(c)(1), or failure to comply with the
criteria set forth in the statute. Id. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A)-(H). The Administrator must act
promptly and the plan promulgated must meet the same statutory criteria. Id. § 1857c-5(c).
16. Id. § 1857c-8. Section 113(a)(1)-(2) provides that:
(1) Whenever, on the basis of any information available to him, the Administrator
finds that any person is in violation of any requirement of an applicable implementa-
tion plan, the Administrator shall notify the person in violation of the plan and the
State in which the plan applies of such finding. If such violation extends beyond the
30th day after the date of the Administrator's notification, the Administrator may
issue an order requiring such person to comply with the requirements of such plan or
he may bring a civil action in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
(2) Whenever, on the basis of information available to him, the Administrator finds
that violations of an applicable implementation plan are so widespread that such
violation appear to result from a failure of the State in which the plan applies to
enforce the plan effectively, he shall so notify the State. If the Administrator finds such
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The basic issue raised was whether the EPA could compel a state
to act to abate pollution using methods prescribed by the federal
government. States argued that the Act did not authorize the use
of coercive action, especially when state funds and governmental
action were required for implementing a plan. The states argued
that if the Act did authorize such action, it violated the commerce
clause 7 and the tenth amendment of the Constitution. 8
This Comment will examine the treatment of the TCPs by the
courts, and discuss the statutory and constitutional objections
raised to challenge enforcement of the plans. The discussion will
start with an early and important court of appeals case, Pennsyl-
vania v. EPA," holding that an imposed plan was enforceable,
and three subsequent cases in which three other federal appeals
courts reached the opposite conclusion.? The Comment will then
consider the issues involved in New York's TCP, a plan proposed
and designed by the State and City of New York, which the Second
failure extends beyond the 30th day after such notice, he shall give public notice of
such finding. During the period beginning with such public notice and ending when
such State satifies the Administrator that it will enforce such plan (hereafter referred
to in this section as 'period of federally assumed enforcement'), the Administrator may
enforce any requirement of such plan with respect to any person-(A) by issuing an
order to comply with such requirement, or (B) by bringing a civil action under subsec-
tion (b) of this section.
Id. § 1857c-8(a)(1)-(2).
Section 113(b) of the Act provides that:
The Administrator may commence a civil action for appropriate relief, including a
permanent or temporary injunction, whenever any person (1) violates or fails or refuses
to comply with any order issued under subsection (a) of this section; or (2) violates
any requirement of an applicable implementation plan during any period of Federally
assumed enforcement after having been notified by the Administrator under subsec-
tion (a)(1) of this section of a finding that' such person is violating such requirement
Id. § 1857c-8(b). Section 113(c) provides for fines of not more than $25,000 per day of violation
or imprisonment not to exceed one year of any person who knowingly violates any requirement
of an applicable plan after receiving the notice provided in section 113(a)(1) or fails to comply
with an order issued under section 113(a). Id. § 1857c-8(c). This section provided the basis
for the litigation discussed in this Comment. Construction of its language was a critical factor
in one major case. Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 834-37 (9th Cir. 1975).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
19. 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974) [hereinafter Pennsylvania].
20. Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) [hereinafter
Brown]; District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971. (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99
(1977); Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99 (1977). These
cases are discussed in part II infra.
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Circuit Court of Appeals held to be binding and enforceable.' Fi-
nally, it will examine the Supreme Court's treatment of the conflict-
ing circuit court decisions" and the New York case. 3
II. The Promulgation and Enforcement of TCPs by the EPA
The earliest case in which a state challenged the EPA's efforts to
promulgate by regulation and enforce a TCP was Pennsylvania v.
EPA.4 In that case the state challenged the EPA's requirement that
it establish a program to ensure the installation of an air bleed
retrofit 5 on pre-1968 vehicles. In addition, the TCP required Penn-
sylvania to set up bikeways, to limit public parking in certain cities
and to implement other specific strategies.26 The state challenged
only the regulation requiring the air bleed retrofit program.27
The Third Circuit held that the application of this regulation and
the federal enforcement procedures under the Act were valid.2 1 Ini-
tially, the court considered the facts on which EPA determined that
the air bleed retrofit program was needed." It found sufficient sup-
port in the regulations promulgating the plan to show that the EPA
action was not arbitrary or capricious. The court then discussed the
crucial issue of whether the enforcement procedures of the Act could
be applied to the state. Section 113 of the statute0 authorized the
EPA to proceed against the state by administrative order of civil
21. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976) [hereinafter Friends II].
The Second Circuit later reaffirmed the position taken in this case when, on remand, the
district court, relying on Brown, refused to order implementation. An appeal followed and
the Second Circuit refused to alter its position. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 296 (1977) (hereinafter Friends III]. These cases are
discussed in part M infra.
22. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
23. Beame v. Friends of the Earth, 98 S. Ct. 296 (1977); Carey v. Friends of the Earth, 98
S. Ct. 296 (1977).
24. 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974).
25. Id. at 248. An air bleed retrofit is a device installed on internal combustion engines
which forces air into the engine resulting in more complete combustion. Id. at 249.
26. Other strategies in the TCP for Pennsylvania included establishing a computer car-
pool matching system, creating exclusive bus lanes, and establishing a vehicle emission
testing system. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 263. Although upholding the application of this strategy to the eastern portion
of the state the court held its application to the western portion was invalid. Id. The court
found that the study conducted in the western portion of the state by the EPA was deficient
and did not provide an adequate basis to mandate this requirement. Id. at 251.
29. Id. at 251-54.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8.
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action to secure compliance with a requirement or a plan.3 1 How-
ever, the EPA could also seek criminal sanctions against a person
who knowingly violated a plan or failed to comply with an order.32
The state challenged the applicability of these statutory provisions
to the states.'
The court framed the issue more broadly. It said the implication
of the state's claim was also to challenge the substantive regulation
requiring the air bleed retrofit and, more importantly, to question
"the power of the Federal Government to require a state to enforce
an implementation plan."'3'
Although the federal regulation required vehicle owners to install
the air bleed retrofit, the EPA also required the state to submit
legally adopted regulations to establish an inspection program, to
cease registration and prohibit operation of non-complying vehicles
and to submit an enforcement schedule to the EPA.3 1 The state
essentially argued that the EPA requirements compelled the state
to enforce federal regulations, thereby requiring the exercise of state
police power and the expenditure of state funds, which was not the
intent of Congress.
Initially the court considered whether the enforcenent scheme of
the Act contemplated that the EPA might require a state to enforce
the substantive strategies of an applicable TCP. In determining
that this was within the intent of Congress the court noted that
"[t]here are only two ways in which [the EPA] could ensure that
these strategies would be implemented: by applying the resources
of the Federal Government to implementing them or requiring the
Commonwealth to do sO. ''31 The court agreed with the EPA's view
that direct federal enforcement was impractical and inefficient.37
31. Id. § 1857c-8(a)(2). Under this provision the Administrator is authorized to act after
concluding the state has failed to enforce the plan, giving notice to the state and giving public
notice. The period from the giving of public notice until enforcement is assured is known as
'the period of federally assumed enforcement."' Id. The language of this section was care-
fully considered in subsequent cases and the section is reproduced in full in the discussion of
those cases.
32. Id. § 1857c-8(c).
33. 500 F.2d at 254. The regulation concerning enforcement, 40 C.F.R. § 52.23 (1974),
applied to all states for which the EPA had promulgated a TCP. Id.
34. 500 F.2d at 256.
35. Id. at 249.
36. Id. at 257.
37. Id. at 257-58.
19781
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But it further reasoned that because the Congress required the state
to implement testing and inspection systems for auto emissions, "it
seems unlikely that it would have had any objection to requiring
states to carry out other programs to reduce pollution from in-use-
vehicles."3 Thus the court found that the EPA was within its statu-
tory authority in requiring the state to implement the air bleed
retrofit strategy and compelling the state to do so by applying the
enforcement procedures available under the statute."9
A second question was whether this statutory provision was au-
thorized by the commerce clause of the Constitution."° The court
began its constitutional analysis with a discussion of Maryland v.
Wirtz." In that case the Supreme Court held that application of
minimum wage, maximum hour laws to employees of state-operated
schools and hospitals was constitutionally permissible. 2 In Wirtz,
the state had claimed that the federal regulation affected a state
governmental function beyond the reach of the commerce clause,
violating the state's sovereignty. The Court had held, in part, that
state economic activities in which private persons are also engaged
are subject to federal regulation under the commerce clause.,3 The
state in Pennsylvania sought to distinguish its position from and
limit the holding of Wirtz. It asserted that the operation of schools
and hospitals was an activity engaged in by private individuals, but
that the registration and inspection of motor vehicles was not.
Therefore, the state claimed that this uniquely governmental func-
tion was beyond the reach of federal commerce clause authority."
The court rejected this argument, saying that the issue in Wirtz was
not the type of activity, but whether the activity affected com-
merce ."5
38. Id. at 258. The court here cited § 110(a)(2)(G) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)
(G), which requires states to implement inspection programs to assure compliance with ve-
hicle emission standards and to devise strategies to reduce pollutant discharge. It then in-
ferred that Congress also intended the states to enforce substantive regulations. 500 F.2d at
258. The court cited legislative history, 116 CONG. Rc. 19204 (1970), in support of its conclu-
sion. Id. Another court has characterized the legislative history as being ambiguous on this
point. Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 835 (9th Cir. 1975).
39. 500 F.2d at 259.
40. Id. at 259-63.
41. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
42. Id. at 193-99.
43. Id. at 195-99.
44. 500 F.2d at 259.
45. Id. at 259-60. The court pointed out that the commerce clause issue must be deter-
mined by the type of activity, not the identity of the actor. This follows because an activity
558 [Vol. VI
TRANSPORTATION CONTROL PLANS
The state also argued for a narrow interpretation of United States
v. California," in which the Supreme Court had held that a state-
operated railroad was subject to the same federal operating regula-
tions as were other railroads.47 The state in Pennsylvania sought to
limit California to its facts,48 arguing that the decision was limited
to commercial activities. The Third Circuit, however, found no such
limitation suggested by California.4
The court said the controlling issue in Wirtz and California was
not the governmental-proprietary distinction, but whether the regu-
lated activity affected commerce and whether the legitimate state
activity - compensating hospital employees, operating a railroad,
or controlling pollution - may ultimately be subjected to the au-
thority delegated to the federal government. The court concluded,
following California, that activities with similar effects on com-
merce are to be treated the same regardless of the entity which
engages in them." The distinction between automotive transporta-
tion systems maintained only by states and railroads and hospitals
run by both states and by private persons was, the court said, irrele-
vant." The court stressed that federal enforcement of the TCP,
rather than violating sovereignty, comported with the federalist
principles of the Constitution and with the "interlocking govern-
mental structure" created by the Act.5"
A little more than a year later, three other circuits considered
similar cases and reached opposite conclusions. 3 Although the three
that is subject to regulation may be engaged in by a state and not exempted from regulation
for that reason. The court also noted that any regulation, valid or not, will interfere with the
state's power. In a footnote the court distinguished Congress' permissible regulation of wages
from the impermissible determination as to how duties are performed. Id.
46. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
47. Id.
48. 500 F.2d at 260.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 260-61. In light of subsequent criticism of this reasoning, Brown v. EPA, 521
F.2d 827, 838 n.45 (9th Cir. 1975), it appears that the court relied more on the similarity of
activity conducted by the state and failed to distinguish between the state's own activities
and its regulatory power over third parties.
51. 500 F.2d at 261.
52. Id. at 262.
53. The two cases not discussed in this Comment are Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215
(4th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) and District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971
(D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99 (1977). In Maryland the state challenged an EPA
regulation requiring it to submit legally adopted regulations, the text of statutory proposals
for the programs and the funding needed to implement various strategies. 530 F.2d at 224.
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courts used different emphases in their decisions, they were essen-
tially similar in their reasoning and holdings. Of these three cases
the most instructive is Brown v. EPA." In-Brown, EPA regulations
required California to implement strategies to control the emission
of photochemical oxidants and carbon monoxide. The required
strategies, part of the state's TCP, included a computerized car pool
matching system, preferential car pool and express bus lanes and
an inspection and maintenance program to reduce emission of pollu-
tants. 5 The EPA contended that it was authorized to bring legal
actions against the state pursuant to the federal enforcement proce-
dures of the Act because of the state's failure to implement the
aforementioned programs. The EPA sought injunctive relief and
sued to hold the state officials in civil contempt, impose a receiver-
ship on state functions, and to force reallocation of funds in the state
budget. 6 Although it eventually discussed the constitutional issues
of the state's challenge, the court held that
the Clean Air Act does not authorize the imposition of sanctions on a
state or its officials for failure to comply with the Administrator's regulations
which direct the state to regulate the pollution-creating activities of those
other than itself, its instrumentalities and subdivisions and the municipali-
ties within its borders."1
The court recognized that the federal government could sanction
a state for polluting the air; however, it could not sanction a state
that did not regulate polluters in the way the EPA directed. The
court found that the Act did not give the EPA the authority it
claimed and that the exercise of such authority, if allowed, would
raise serious constitutional problems. Thus the court's ruling was in
direct contradiction to Pennsylvania.
The court held that "the EPA was without authority under the statute ... to require Mary-
land to establish the programs and furnish the legal authority for the administration there-
of." Id. at 228. In Train the court similarly found that the Administrator's regulations re-
quiring local legislation to implement a retrofit program and create bicycle lanes and an in-
spection program exceeded the statutory authority. 521 F.2d at 986-87.
54. 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
55. Id. at 830.
56. Id. at 831.
57. Id. at 832. The distinction between the state's own activities and its regulation of the
activities of others was crucial in determining the extent of both the statutory and constitu-
tional authority. It was also a distinction that the court in Pennsylvania did not draw.
Pennsylvania found that the actor's identity was irrelevant. 500 F.2d at 261. Failure to note
this distinction led to the Brown court's criticism of Pennsylvania. 521 F.2d at 838 n.45.
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The court rigorously analyzed the language of the provisions per-
taining to federal enforcement procedures." Section 113(a)(2) of the
Act59 provides that when the Administrator finds violations of an
applicable implementation plan caused by the state's failure to en-
force it, he will notify "the state." The Administrator must then
wait for 30 days after the giving of public notice to enforce any
strategy of a plan against "any person" by issuing a compliance
order or by bringing a civil action. The EPA relied on this section
in bringing an enforcement action against the state because
"person" is defined by the Act to include a "state.""
But the court, rather than reading "person" to include "state" in
the enforcement section, found that Congress sought to distinguish
"person" and "state."'" As is the case in subsection (a)(2), sub-
section (a)(1)"2 provides that when the Administrator finds viola-
tions of a TCP, he must so notify the violator and the state in which
the TCP applied. Thus, rather than "state" being subsumed within
"person," the court found that the enforcement provisions treated
the state as a separate entity."3
The court noted that if Congress had intended to allow an action
to be brought against the state, it could have so provided as it had
in the notice provision."4 However in the enforcement section, the
notice is to the "state" and the action is against the person in
violation.w
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8.
59. Id. § 1857c-8(a)(2) This section provides that:
(2) Whenever, on the basis of information available to him, the Administrator finds
that violations of an applicable implementation plan are so widespread that such
violation appear to result from a failure of the State in which the plan applies to
enforce the plan effectively, he shall so notify the State. If the Administrator finds such
failure extends beyond the 30th day after such notice, he shall give public notice of
such finding. During the period beginning with such public notice and ending when
such State satisfies the Administrator that it will enforce such plan (hereafter referred
to in this section as 'period of federally assumed enforcement'), the Administrator may
enforce any requirement of such plan with respect to any person-(A) by issuing an
order to comply with such requirement, or (B) by bringing a civil action under subsec-
tion (b) of this section.
Id.
60. Id. § 1857h(e) (emphasis added).
61. 521 F.2d at 834-37.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(1).
63. 521 F.2d at 834.
64. Id. The court stated that had Congress intended to allow the EPA to bring an action
to be brought against the state it could have made this intent explicit. It also pointed out
that, in contrast, the Administrator's regulations had made this intent clear.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(2).
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The court noted that, had Congress intended a different effect, it
would have been more explicit, particularly in "light of the delicacy
with which federal-state relations always have been treated by all
branches of the Federal government."66 The effect of the court's
reading of this section is that the EPA may bring an action against
the violator of the plan. If this is ineffective or would be inappro-
priate, and the state fails to enforce the requirement after being
notified of the violation, the recourse available to the EPA is direct
federal implementation. The court noted that these options were
parallel to those under which the TCPs were promulgated. 7
The Ninth Circuit found that the statute did not permit the EPA
to go further and force the state to implement a plan. It said that a
contrary reading was incompatible with the Act's "cooperative fed-
eralism that made use of techniques such as preemption, delegation
of federal authority and other opportunities created for the states
to participate in controlling air pollution."" It further noted that
such a reading would transform the states into departments of the
EPA."
If the EPA's interpretation were given effect, the court said, seri-
ous constitutional problems would arise. The EPA, relying on Wirtz
and California, argued that valid regulations of commerce do not
become invalid because a state is engaging in the regulated activity.
Furthermore, the state may be as validly required to control air
pollution as it is to operate its railroad in conformity with federal
safety regulations.70 But the state argued that under the commerce
power it could not be compelled to take governmental action with
respect to activities within the reach of the commerce power.' Thus
it conceded that control of air pollution was a valid subject for
federal regulation, but contended that the state could be compelled
to regulate an activity within federal authority. The court agreed
that air pollution in a state was a proper subject of federal regula-
tion, but it found that the commerce clause did not permit the
66. 521 F.2d at 834.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 835. In reaching the same conclusion when considering the extent of the com-
merce clause, the court said that to accept the EPA's argument "would reduce the states to
puppets of a ventriloquist Congress." Id. at 839.
70. Id. at 837-38.
71. Id. at 838.
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federal government to compel the state to regulate pollution in the
manner directed by the federal government.72
This limiting of the authority given by the commerce clause was
based on the decision in Wirtz which the court of appeals said
distinguished between a state engaging in commerce and the state's
regulation of the commence of others. This distinction, not the re-
moval of the governmental-proprietary distinction, was the basis of
Wirtz. In either instance the "commerce" is subject to federal regu-
lation, but the state's regulation of commerce is not itself
"commerce" subject to federal authority.73
The court pointed out that the Administrator was not merely
insisting that the state regulation not burden commerce, nor was he
merely seeking to establish that federal authority in the area of air
pollution was preemptive of state action.7 The EPA's position was
a far more radical departure from conventional commerce clause
theory than these two doctrines. The court asserted that its restric-
tion of the EPA's authority would neither deprive it of the ability
to regulate air pollution nor raise the constitutional problems occa-
sioned by a broader reading;75 that is, a serious effect "on the struc-
ture of the existence of our federal system." Also the court noted
that federal law often told the states not to do certain things, but
that it rarely compelled the states to act affirmatively.77
III. State-designed Plans and Citizen Suits: A Counterpoint
During and after the period in which the courts decided
Pennsylvania and Brown, the Second Circuit found the New York
TCP enforceable in Friends of the Earth v. Carey (Friends III).
72. Id. at 839.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 839-40. The court cited several cases holding that in its power to regulate
commerce Congress may prevent the state's exercise of police powers that burden interstate
commerce, Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970), Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,
359 U.S. 520 (1959), Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), and that Congress
may pre-empt local authority in certain situations, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961), Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
* Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947), Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
75. Id. at 840. The court pointed out some acceptable means that Congress could employ
to achieve the goals sought by the EPA. These included economic incentives and limiting the
ways states could regulate aspects of commerce if they chose to regulate it at all.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 841.
78. 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1976).
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However, this case had two significant features that made it distin-
guishable from Pefinsylvania and Brown. The first was that the suit
was brought by environmental groups under the Act's citizen suit
provision" rather than by the EPA seeking enforcement. The second
and more important distinction was that the TCP involved was
developed and designed by the State and City of New York.80 Al-
though the TCP contained many strategies, those challenged in the
case were a reduction in business-district parking, decreases in taxi-
cab cruising, imposition of tolls at certain bridges and night time
freight movement programs. The intended effect of these strategies
was to limit vehicle use in the New York City metropolitan area to
reduce the levels of carbon monoxide, hydrocarbon and photochemi-
cal oxidant pollutants to the levels permitted by the EPA.
In the course of the litigation the TCP was before the Second
Circuit on three occasions. In Friends I, the court found the plan
valid in all material aspects." Subsequently, the plan was held to
be enforceable against the city and state despite the continued nego-
tiation of consensual administrative orders and difficulties involved
in court supervision of the implementation of Friends 11.82 Neverthe-
less, after these two decisions, the district court heard a constitu-
tional challenge to the TCP83 and its decision "all but emasculated
the Plan as an enforceable instrument."'" The district court had
relied on Brown"6 and a recent Supreme Court case, National
League of Cities v. Usery 8 Y
National League of Cities held that extension of minimum wage
and maximum hour regulations to virtually all state and municipal
employees exceeded the authority of the commerce clauseY.8 This
decision also overruled Wirtz, saying that such an attempt to regu-
late commerce displaced the states' sovereign authority concerning
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2. This was significant because the court did not have the language
of § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8, concerning federal enforcement procedures, before it. Therefore
it did not have to consider whether the Act allowed the EPA to proceed against a state that
failed to enforce a plan or only against the "person" in violation of the plan.
80. 552 F.2d at 30.
81. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 499 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir. 1974).
82. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976).
83. See 552 F.2d at 29.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
87. Id. at 854-55.
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the conduct of integral government functions and would impair
their ability to manage their own relations with their employees. 8
Following this reasoning, the district court found that the TCP
bound the state only to the extent that it was a polluter itself. It
could not be compelled to regulate other polluters.'
The decision of the district court, Brown, and National League of
Cities notwithstanding, Friends III again found the TCP enforceable
and distinguished both Brown'" and National League of Cities."
While not expressing a view as to the correctness of Brown, the court
said that "the facts and issues here are significantly different and
clearly distinguishable."" The major difference was that the state
and city were the architects of the plan. Rather than having the
EPA promulgate a plan, the State and City of New York had formu-
lated their own policy and made their own decisions as to how they
would control pollution to meet the standards and requirements of
the Act.
The court did not find any impermissible interference with the
governmental functions of the state and city. This had been a deci-
sive factor in Brown." The court found that rather than an imposi-
tion, there was a pact between the federal and local governments."
Under the Act's scheme of cooperative federalism, the state and city
had made two deliberate policy choices. The first and most critical
was that they, not the federal government, would decide which
strategies to employ. Secondly, the local governments chose the
strategies they would implement. Thus the court would not allow
the local branches of government to "renege on their own creation
and commitment."9 5
Friends HI then considered the effect of National League of Cities
and whether the TCP and the EPA's efforts to control pollution
constituted an impermissible impairment of integral government
functions. 9 Again the court readily distinguished the two cases.
88. Id. at 845-46.
89. 552 F.2d at 29.
90. 552 F.2d at 36.
91. Id. at 38.
92. Id. at 36.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 37.
95. Id. at 34.
96. Id. at 37-38.
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The court first noted the concession that air pollution was subject
to federal regulation. Then it stated that National League of Cities
had found only that the means, not the subject matter, of regulation
were invalid. Thus if the subject matter could be validly regulated,
the question became whether the means employed were permissible.
To make this determination the court said a test that weighed the
reason for the regulation against the extent of the intrusion must be
applied. 7 In this case the court balanced the need to abate pollution
against the burden imposed upon the local government.
The court found the TCP posed at most a minimum of interfer-
ence in that the state and city, by designing the TCP, had exercised
their authority. Therefore they could not claim an impermissible
interference with their sovereign prerogatives. On the other hand
air pollution was a recognized, serious problem in urban areas and
its abatement was a national policy. On this basis the court found
that the enforcement of the plan was not an impermissible inter-
ference under the rules of National League of Cities.
Friends III also noted that the claimed interference was not with
an integral government function. 8 Contrasting National League of
Cities, in which the federal action would effectively dictate policy
and perhaps budget priorities, the court found that implementation
of the plan would require at most only procedural or regulatory
changes. Any financial obligations resulting would not be imposi-
tions since they were considered in the design of the TCP.
The determination of whether an activity was an integral govern-
ment function was not based solely on the longevity of it. Although
localities historically had regulated transportation and traffic, their
concern had not been regulation to control pollution. And the mere
traditional concern, especially when it is for a particular and differ-
ent purpose, would not result in an activity becoming an integral
government function for all purposes. In making this observation
the court noted that National League of Cities had reaffirmed
United States v. California, which held that a state-operated rail-
road was not beyond federal regulation merely because it was state-
operated. Thus the activity in Friends III, like that in California,
while admittedly governmental, was not an integral function. The
federal regulation was not directed towards the locality's historical
97. Id. at 37.
98. Id.
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concern, nor would it impinge upon financial and policy decisions
as the regulation in National League of Cities had."
Friends III did acknowledge that National League of Cities had
imposed a restriction on the commerce clause authority, but it
found that the present facts were closer to those in-Fry v. United
States.10 Fry, which had been distinguished and left intact by
National League of Cities, concerned the Economic Stabilization
Act of 1970 and the President's authority under it to freeze the
wages of state employees. That action, challenged as being in
excess of commerce clause authority, was upheld because" the legis-
lation addressed a serious national problem, because its implemen-
tation was designed to have a minimal impact on the states' author-
ity and because it displaced no state discretion in the area of govern-
mental operation. The court saw the enforcement mechanism in-
volved in the case before it as having attributes similar to Fry and
lacking the intrusive features found in National League of Cities."'
IV. TCPs in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has considered an appeal from Brown and
denied an application for certiorari in Friends III. In the former case
the Court vacated the lower court's decision"2 leaving Pennsylvania,
which had held an imposed plan enforceable, as the leading decision
on that question. In denying certiorari in Friends 111,103 the Court let
99. Id. In reaching its conclusion that the TCP was not an impermissible interference with
an integral government function the court isolated these distinguishing features: the plan had
been designed by the state and city; its effect on policy and budget was minimal; any costs
were contemplated by the city in the plan's design; and operation of streets and bridges to
control pollution was not an integral government function.
100. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
101. 552 F.2d at 39. The Brown court also cited Fry as an '"unintrusive' regulation of
commerce. 521 F.2d at 839.
102. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); EPA v. Maryland, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); Train v.
District of Columbia, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); Train v. State Air Pollution Control Bd., 431 U.S.
99 (1977).
103. Beame v. Friends of the Earth, 98 S. Ct. 296 (1977); Carey v. Friends'of the Earth,
98 S. Ct. 296 (1977). The City of New York had previously applied to Mr. Justice Marshall
for a stay in the enforcement of the Second Circuit's order in Friends III. Beame v. Friends
of the Earth, 98 S. Ct. 4 (1977). Characterizing the case as "the most recent skirmish in a
long legal battle," Justice Marshall noted that "the fact that New York promulgated its own
plan makes this case significantly different from Brown." In stating that the applicant had
not met its burden of persuasion, Justice Marshall found that the delay by the city in seek-
ing a stay undercut its allegations that enforcement of the order would have little impact on
pollution and would place unreasonable burdens on the city. Id. at 7. The respondents argued
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stand the Second Circuit's decision holding a state-designed plan
enforceable.
In EPA v. Brown the Court vacated the decisions of the various
circuits and remanded the cases for consideration of mootness. This
situation arose for two reasons. First, because the EPA conceded
that requiring states to submit legally adopted regulations to imple-
ment a plan was invalid unless modified.04 Second, the EPA's ap-
peal also challenged only the invalidation of the regulation requiring
state inspection and maintenance programs. 05 This led the Court to
conclude that "the case has undergone a great deal of shrinkage
since the decisions below."'"
V. Conclusion
Although the Supreme Court's treatment of the TCPs was insub-
stantial and was not addressed to the statutory and constitutional
issues presented, its actions removed certain issues from contention.
First, the state-designed plans may be enforced against a state
through a citizen suit. Second, the EPA may enforce a TCP that it
has promulgated by regulation to the extent that it does not require
the states to submit legally adopted regulations or legislation to
accomplish implementation. Third, both the imposed and state-
designed TCPs will have substantially the same effect. Had the
Brown and Friends III circuit court decisions both been upheld, the
anomalous result would have been that a state that made an at-
tempt to comply with the Act would have been bound, while one
that did nothing would have been beyond the reach of the EPA.
Now the decisions have a harmony that previously did not exist.
It also seems clear that negotiated implementation of the TCP's will
become the standard practice. In both lines of cases, lengthy and
costly litigation has led to very little actual implementation, 07 and
that rather than a burden, enforcement of the order would have economic benefits. Holding
in favor of the respondents, Justice Marshall said that any adverse economic impact could
be remedied by an accommodation with the EPA. Id. at 7.
104. 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
105. Id.
106. Id. Justice Stevens dissented, saying that until the regulations in question were
actually rescinded the case was not moot and that the EPA's admission of the invaldity of
the regulations was not grounds for vacating the judgments of the court of appeals. Justice
Stevens said that either the writs should be dismissed or the case decided on its merits. The
Court's decision, he said, gave "the Government a partial victory ... for an apparent conces-
sion." Id.
107. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality 4 (1976).
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serious problems, such as funding and legislative authority for im-
plementation, still exist. The EPA's victory, limited as it is, may
prove to be somewhat Pyrrhic in that the states do not appear to
be rushing towards implementation and the agency has conceded
the invalidity of some of its strongest weapons to combat this. If it
may be said that the legal issues have been resolved, it must surely
be admitted that the practical problems may have just begun.
William E. Bell

